Abstract R e advent of deceniralized computing and an increasingly important role for information as a resource has prompted the development of a variety of methoak and tools for managing the risk exposure of a computer system As a result of the diversity of risk management tools currently available, there i s no effective means of determining which of the took would be most suitable for any given organization's situation A new technique is proposed to efectively and objectively evaluate these tools for suitability and to establish a means of comparison of the tools among each other.
Introduction
The need for acceptable computer security risk management practices is becoming more evident throughout the federal and commercial environment because of the sophistication and complexity of today's technology and the increased value society has placed on information. Research over the last four to five years has focused on establishment and refinement of a formalized framework for risk management [l] , [2] and many automated tools have been developed by commercial and governmental organizations. Despite the attention given to the development of a framework, little has been done to establish a technique for determining which risk management tool or method is most appropriate for a given situation. Hoffman noted at the 1986 National Computer Security Conference:
"One significant lack today is metrics for risk analysis and risk management. There is no currently accepted set of criteria against which all methods can be compared. It is difficult to evaluate or to convey the advantages and disadvantages of a given methodology or tool when no accepted evaluation metric exists." [31 Risk analysis criteria are a vital component of the selection of any risk management procedure. Without the means of comparing or evaluating decision-making methodologies, the metadecision (the decision of which method to use to make a decision) becomes arbitrary and capricious. The selection of an inappropriate method or tool could lead to excessive costs, misdirected effort, and the loss of assets. Excessive costs could result from the selection of a more expensive safeguard than is actually necessary, or from misdirected effort. The ultimate impact of an inappropriate decision could manifest itself in the loss of assets. Intuitively, the use of the wrong methodology could be worse than not performing risk management at all. Metrics could provide the means by which a framework, procedure, or tool is measured for determining the most appropriate methodology for a given situation. Referring to a risk management framework currently under modification and enhancement, Browne writes:
"One of the missing elements of the Framework is an exposition of the criteria that a user organization or a methodology developer needs to know in order to create, enhance, or evaluate a methodology or methodological tool.
Given a purpose and an objective for risk assessment, a government agency or commercial organization should have a criteria list so that a variety of methodologies can be evaluated. For example, issues of: breadth of analysis, depth of analysis, cost of analysis, precision of results, reputability [sic] , and materiality need to be explicit, and can form the basis for an evaluation of a given methodology. Different situations will call for different solutions. The trade-offs need to be known.
The developers and vendors of risk management methodologies can use the same criteria to position their offerings and provide solutions that meet the needs of their client base." [41
Previous Research
The Risk Management Research Laboratory, sponsored jointly by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Computer Security Center (NCSC), provides facilities to examine and compare various commercially available risk management products. The lab has become a central repository of risk management tools which facilitates the accessibility of the products for evaluation and comparison by federal agencies. During the coufse of our research, we had the opportunity to visit the lab and examine over two dozen risk management packages. Although the lab provides the convenience of having these products at one location, we experienced the frustration and confusion of the absence of an evaluation and comparison criteria.
The lack of a systematic and standard comparison criteria makes any attempt at evaluating tools arbitrary and indiscriminate. It is apparent that most managers in the position of selecting an automated risk management tool (or more generally, selecting a methodology for risk management) have little guidance or rationale to make a suitability determination. If the NIST/NCSC lab could incorporate a technique which provided a standardized evaluation method, its functionality would be greatly enhanced.
To date, no known effort has been directed toward the development of metrics for the evaluation of risk analysis and risk management methods and the wide variety of automated tools for computer security. In 1981, Fischhoff, et al, attempted to establish evaluation criteria for social science risk analysis methods. They were able to categorize acceptable-risk decision making methods into three groups: 1) f m a l analysis, 2) bootstrapping, and 3) professional judgement to which they subjectively applied seven criteria of acceptability. Fischhoff's criteria were qualitatively defined. [51 Merkhofer also proposed criteria for the evaluation o f social risk management and decision-aiding approaches. Merkhofer categorizes criteria for evaluation as either intemal (which pertains to the domain of the analysis) or extemal (which pertains to the considerations and constraints outside of the analysis).
Within this classification of the considerations for a particular decision-aiding approach, Merkhofer specifically defines criteria as "logical soundness," "completeness," "accuracy," "practicality," and "acceptability." Each of these criterion are used to assist the analyst in determining which methodology is most suitable for his given situation.
Unfortunately, the interpretation of the meaning or degree of applicability for each criterion is left to the judgement of the analyst. [61
The desire for a more objective or measurable criteria is to remove analysts' deficiencies or biases from the evaluation, thereby enhancing the evaluation of suitability of a method to a given situation. Using Merkhofer's criterion of practicality, how does one distinguish all the attributes that describe practicality for one method and compare them with those of another method using qualitative descriptions? What Merkhofer's method needs is a technique that would granulate each criterion and each attribute to a level that could be quantitatively measured.
The research conducted in the field of Software Engineering, specifically the development of software quality metrics, provides a means of quantitatively measuring quality. Software engineering metrics assist an evaluator in assessing the quality of software under development. We recognized this ability to quantitatively measure qualitative characteristics as adaptable to the problems of risk management. The works of software quality pioneers such as McCall VI, Boehm [81. and others were carefully studied to adapt their methods to suit the risk management and risk analysis disciplines.
Utilizing their techniques, a conceptual approach for the formulation of our evaluation method was developed.
This approach necessitates the establishment of the relationships of criteria to suitability and the definition of those criteria. Further decomposition of each criterion desaibes those attributes necessary to quantify a series of measurable components [71. These components form a set of metrics that are used to provide a value for each of the criteria In this paper, we propose an evaluation strategy for comparing computer security risk management methodologies and tools through granulation of criteria to their measurable components.
Evaluation Metria
This paper provides a means of quantitatively measuring the suitability of a method or tool for a particular organization for the purpose of evaluating methods or tools. What is suitability? We define suitability as those characteristics of a risk management methodology or tool that are pertinent and appropriate for the requirements of a particular person, organization, system, and/or situation. Use of predefined criteria for evaluation of tools and methods allows the user to make comparisons based on a standard continuum and to tailor an evaluation to his particular needs. As it will become apparent, the criteria and their attributes are qualitative in nature thus they submit themselves to subjective interp-etation. At this level, the evaluation criteria for suitability are just as difficult to discem as suitability in totality. We remedied this by further decomposition of each attribute, into what are referred to as metrics, which provide a quantitative desaiption of the suitability criteria. The procedure that will be used to accomplish this is listed in Table 1. By taking this approach, the analysis of suitability becomes standardized, flexible, and expandable.
Standardization of the evaluation method will provide continuity in comparative figures.
For instance, adaptability is judged consistently across all methods or tools and can therefore be used as a comparative measure. The analysis becomes flexible because the organization making the evaluation can choose which of the criteria best define Suitability for their organization. As an illustration, in an organization where there are a wide variety of computer system configurations, adaptability and consistency might be more important than useability. In this case, greater weight could be added to adaptability and consistency. As the definitions of suitability are refined, the analytical method presented is expandable by simply adding metrics, attributes, oc aiteria as they are developed. This paper w i l l detail the procedures we employed to achieve steps 1 through 3 from Table 1 Following the procedures listed earlier, our fist task was to specify the criteria that describe suitability. Adjectives that typify suitability were listed and then grouped according to their relationships with each other. Each of the groupings constituted a criterion while the adjectives in the group became the attributes of the criterion.
Finally, we defined the attributes in tams of a comprehensive set of rudimentary, boolean questions.
These questions comprise our metrics. For example, the question, "Is there a standardized interface?" is a metric of the attribute 'ease of use.' The questions were worded to imply a positive aspect of the attribute if answered in the affirmative. In this way, the existence of that metric implies that the characteristic contributes to the presence of the attribute.
The result o f this process was seven criteria composed of between two and four attributes. The criteria are: consktency, useability, adaptability, feasibility, completeness, valhiity, and credibility (see Table 2 ). Each will be discussed in the paragraphs below.
The concept of consistency, as applied to suitability of risk management methods or tools, implies an ability to duplicate the results of the process. In other words, given a particular system configuration, results obtained from 2. Define the suitability criteria in terms of related attributes.
3. Specify metrics that describe the presence of the attributes.
4.
Make a quantitative statement of the appearance of the suitability criteria by determining the ratio of actual occurrences of a metric to the number of possible occumences.
5.
Use the derived quantitative values for each of the criteria to evaluate and compare the variety of methods and tools available to the organization. independent analysis will not significantly differ.
Consistency was determined to have the attributes of reliability and consktent terminology.
Useability is defined as the value of the effort necessary to learn, p p a r e input, execute the process, and interpret output. The four steps described above represent the interface between the analyst and the process. Hence, for a p..ocess to be useable to an operator, it must be understandable, easy to use, simple, and effective at handling errors.
Adaptabity describes suitability in so much as the structure of the method or tool can be applied to a variety of computer system configurations. Additionally, stored data can be easily updated as it periodically changes. The attributes that describe adaptability are portability and modijkbility .
The criterion of feasibility characterizes the input data to a method. It is concerned with the amount of data that must be collected, the economy of gathering that data, and whether the data is obtainable without extraordinary measures. The attributes that describe feasibility are availability, practicality and scope.
Completeness is defined as providing comprehensive coverage of all considerations of the risk management problem. To be complete, a method should regard all components and the attributes of those components of the system. Additionally, the process should examine the computer system at the level of detail desired by the analyst. The attributes that d d b e completeness are scope, elements and element attributes.
Validity is measured as the extent to which the results of the process represent the real phenomenon. In other words, the conclusion of the analysis resembles what is experienced in reality. For instance, if the process recommends a perimeter fence for a computer center located on the twelfth floor of an office building, the process is not valid. The attributes that describe validity are relevancy, scope and practicality.
The credibility of a particular method or process has significant bearing on the acceptability of its conclusions. If any aspect of the process is questionable, the entire process will be suspect to the users. The attributes that describe credibility are intuitiveness and reliability.
Additional and more detailed descriptions of each of the criteria, their attributes, and their associated metrics (including a justification for each criterion and attribute) is found in Gamabrants and Ellis [91. The following section will describe how the evaluation method can be utilized.
Application of the Metria
The relationship between criteria, their attributes, and metrics described above supports formulation of a simple mathematical relationship between the metrics and their associated criterion. When an evaluation of a method or tool takes place, the resultant measurements can be viewed as a set: TABLE 2. Suitability Criteria Consistency. Given a particular system configuration, results obtained from independent analysis will not significantly differ.
Useability. The effort necessary to learn, operate, prepare inpt. and interpret output is generally worth the results obtained.
Adautability. The structure of the method or tool can be applied to a variety of computer system configurations (and the inputs can be easily updated as they periodically change).
Feasibility. The required data is available and can be economically gathered.
Completeness. Consideration of all relevant relationships and elements of risk management is given.
Validity. The results of the process represent the real phenomenon.
Credibility. The output is believable and has merit. A criterion, C,., in tum. is expressed mathematically as a ratio of the sum of the attributes' values to the number of attributes:
With expressions of aiteria described, a desaiption of the suitability, S, of a method or tool can be expressed as an ordered set of the values of its aiteria:
(4)
Finally, an evaluation of a method is simplified by comparison of the suitability expressions of various risk management methods or tools. For instance, the suitability of a particular method can be compared to another method by examining the elements of the two vectors, S, and S, . A 'suitability index,' St, can be derived by attaching appropriate weights, Wq, to the aiteria and summing the results for all criteria. The suitability index is then expressed as a ratio:
The approach described above, referred to as the normative relationship model, is the most simple application of the evaluation technique. Additional methods of application of the evaluation metrics (two additional models that generalize the application of the metrics to non-binary methods) are described in detail in Garrabrants and Ellis 191. This reference also provides an example of the application of the CERTS method described above against four risk management tools. management tool might fulfill the needs of a particular group of organizations. An organization's search and comparisons for a suitable tool would be greatly simplified if the comparison were limited to a small sample that was selected from a category of tools determined to be most likely to fulfil their requirements.
Conclusions
References As described, it becomes apparent that not all of the criteria can be maximized simultaneously. This is because some criteria are maximized at the expense of others. For example, in order to achieve useability, some degree of completeness will likely be sacrificed. Determining the best risk management tool or method will require trading one desirable trait for another. Merkhofer observed the same phenomenon:
"Notice that the various evaluation criteria are not independent.
Weaknesses in some areas (e.g. logical soundness) are likely to preclude strengths in others (e.g. acceptability).
Furthermore, some of the goals may be in conflict. It may be easier to derive a logically sound decision rule by leaving out certain awkward issues and thereby saaificing completeness.
If no approach does, or even can, satisfy all of the aiteria and if their respective strengths and weaknesses lie in different areas, then the choice of an approach will require tradeoffs." [lo] Consequently, it is felt by the authors that a categorical statement of which method is the "best" cannot be made. Suitability of a method can only be determined by careful consideration of the needs of the organization with respect to the criteria and attributes under evaluation. After that consideration, a choice of which tool is most suitable can be made.
After a thorough review of the metrics, attributes, and criteria, we feel that a "best" risk management technique cannot be developed that will satisfy the needs of all organizations. Through the consideration of all aspects of risk management (the method, the management team, and the system) with an evaluation technique similar to the criteria evaluation proposed here, satisfaction of a particular organizational need can be fulfilled. Additional research that examines risk management from a holistic viewpoint may be able to classify existing risk management tools to make general categorical statements of their capabilities. For instance, a particular risk
